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JUST BECAUSE YOU CAN  
MEASURE SOMETHING,  
DOES IT REALLY COUNT? 
LAURA DENVIR STITH† 
I am pleased to have an opportunity to comment on Judicial 
Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and 
Their Judges by Professor Stephen J. Choi, Professor Mitu Gulati, 
and Professor Eric A. Posner.1 In this day in which computer models 
are used to analyze so many aspects of American society, and in 
which statistical analysis is so often turned to as a substitute for 
individual or subjective analysis, it is not surprising that scholars may 
be interested in determining whether one could apply similar 
measurement models to other arenas as well, including the work of 
the courts. 
Such empirical research can be of value in certain areas involving 
the courts. Missouri uses such analyses, for instance, to help compare 
how many cases are filed in one part of the state versus another, 
whether the numbers of certain types of cases rise or fall, the length 
of sentence relative to different geographic areas and recidivism rates, 
the cost and benefit of incarceration versus assignment of offenders to 
drug or other problem-solving court programs, and similar uses. 
It is less clear that empirical methods can be usefully applied to 
areas of the law that are, if undertaken properly, intended to be 
subjective and to involve complex judgments or that are supervisory 
or educational in nature. Such is my and other judges’ concern with 
the authors’ attempt to examine the quality and industriousness of 
various state supreme courts by attempting to measure their 
productivity, influence, and political independence based on a 
quantitative analysis of the number of opinions handed down, the 
number of out-of-state citations to those opinions, and the degree of 
political independence of court members as measured by number of 
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 † Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Missouri. 
 1. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information 
Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313 (2009). 
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dissents written. The quantitative measures chosen seem to be 
unrelated to the qualitative inferences the authors derive from them. 
I can understand why, in the academic arena, methods that 
measure the number of articles written and how often they are cited 
could be a useful part of evaluating the quality or stature of a 
professor.2 In fact, I wrote an article in 2004 that was cited in a United 
States Supreme Court decision, Danforth v. Minnesota,3 on why it is 
not improper for states to apply different standards in determining 
their habeas jurisdiction than are applied by federal courts, which are 
limited by principles of federalism.4 I was delighted by the citation, 
and felt it added to my article’s stature. 
But that is not how or why I write my opinions as a judge, nor, in 
my estimation, should it be. On a fundamental level, I reject the 
attempt to quantify the work of courts by placing courts on a grid, 
with each box standing for a measure such as number of opinions, 
citations, dissents, motions ruled, rules adopted, and so forth. The 
authors themselves note that similar attempts at using studies of 
objective output to measure subjective quality since the early 1900s 
have been sporadic and have not developed into a consistent school 
of study.5 
I would suggest that this approach does nothing beyond 
providing an accurate measure of those things it sets out to quantify. 
No matter how much one breaks down the criteria used as measures, 
those criteria still miss the essence of judging. By their nature these 
criteria can measure only what they are set up to measure. 
By way of a perhaps somewhat controversial example, I would 
analogize to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. However many new 
boxes the Guidelines create for different facts, and however useful 
they are as part of the larger dynamic of making good sentencing 
policy, they are still just boxes, and judges find that although 
 
 2. Although, I would suggest, the value of what is contained in the articles, whether it is a 
piece of serious scholarship or just plays to currently popular but passing legal fads, whether the 
professor can teach, both measured by popularity and by student learning, and so forth, are 
equally important measures. 
 3. Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 n.14 (2008). 
 4. Laura Denvir Stith, A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to Grant Habeas 
Relief, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 449 (2004). 
 5. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1329–31 (recognizing that, even with the popularity of 
ranking systems—specifically the Chamber of Commerce rankings—there are only five 
academic studies that attempt to rank the state high courts). 
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measures help, they cannot replace the ultimate, unquantifiable 
measure—judgment.6 
How then could the three criteria the authors propose to use (or 
double that number) accurately judge the quality of justice provided 
in our state supreme courts? Sections I, II and III analyze these three 
criteria—productivity, influence, and political independence, as 
measured, respectively, by the number of opinions issued per year, 
the number of times those opinions are cited by other state or federal 
courts, and the number of times a judge dissents from opinions 
written by a judge of the same party. Section IV then offers a broader 
commentary on the work of state supreme courts. I conclude that 
those measures do not, in turn, provide useful indicia of judicial 
quality or even competence, particularly when the court being 
measured is a state supreme court. 
I.  NUMBER OF CITATIONS AS A MEASURE OF  
QUALITY OF JUDGMENT 
The first criterion of a good court, the authors suggest, is 
productivity, as measured by the number of opinions written by each 
court on average.7 The authors say that they chose this criterion based 
on an underlying assumption that, “all else being equal, a judge who 
publishes more opinions is better than a judge who publishes fewer 
opinions.”8 They also assume that state high courts that publish few 
opinions risk allowing inconsistency to arise in opinions written by the 
lower courts.9  
The paper suggests that state supreme court judges write an 
average of a little more than twenty opinions per judge per year,10 and 
that those who write fewer than that number, basically, need to just 
work harder so they can be as successful as their more prolific 
counterparts. 
 
 6. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 82 (1998) (“The Guidelines have replaced the traditional judicial role 
of deliberation and moral judgment . . . with complex quantitative calculations that convey the 
impression of scientific precision and objectivity.”). 
 7. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1320 (“‘Productivity’ refers to the number of opinions a 
judge publishes in a year.”). 
 8. Id.  
 9. See id. at 1321 (“[A] judge who publishes an opinion shares her reasoning with . . . 
other judges who seek to understand the resolution of the dispute.”). 
 10. Id. (“[T]he median state was Kansas (23.0 opinions per judge per year).”); id. at 1338–
40 tbl.4 (showing the number of citations/judge/year for all 52 “states”). 
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I would suggest that numbers are not a valid measure of judicial 
competence or even of judicial work ethic. As I am most familiar with 
Missouri’s judiciary, I will use it as an example. I was not a supreme 
court judge during the 1998–2001 period analyzed by the authors, but 
I was a Missouri court of appeals judge from October 1994 until 
February 2001. During that time, I wrote approximately 275 
published opinions and 125 unpublished ones, averaging between 
sixty-five and seventy-five opinions per year, in addition to handling 
hundreds of writs each year that were denied without opinion. Since I 
joined the Supreme Court in 2001, I have probably authored an 
average of fifteen opinions or fewer per year. Did I go from being a 
great judge to being a lazy judge? Do I just need to write more 
opinions to become a great judge so I am pulling my share of the load 
and so I can better police and correct inconsistencies in intermediate 
appellate decisions? 
The short answer to both questions is no. In the 1960s and early 
1970s, Missouri did not have a unified court system, had only a small 
intermediate appellate court and supreme court judges averaged forty 
to fifty published decisions each year. But, as Missouri unified the 
court system and the court took on a larger supervisory role as head 
of Missouri’s court system, the court’s philosophy changed from 
taking any case that might theoretically be a useful subject of 
supreme court opinion, to limiting its consideration to those areas on 
which it had not yet or recently spoken, or as to which the court of 
appeals or trial courts or lawyers seemed to evidence confusion and a 
need for guidance. 
Missouri also rejected the model, perhaps still popular in some 
other jurisdictions, of taking larger numbers of cases than necessary 
on transfer—what others would call granting certiorari—and then for 
the most part adopting the court of appeals’ very accurate reasoning 
so that the decision would be one from the supreme court. While this 
certainly would increase supreme court decision statistics, Missouri 
believes it is more efficient, and leads to better decisionmaking, to 
allow court of appeals judges to know that, even in an important area 
of law, if they correctly understand, explicate and apply the law, their 
opinion will be the one to be published.11 
 
 11. If the Missouri Supreme Court takes transfer of a case, it hears the case as if on original 
appeal, MO. CONST. art. V, § 10. This historically always meant the court of appeals opinion 
drops out of the case and is not officially published nor can it be cited. State v. Norman, 380 
S.W.2d 406, 407 (Mo. 1964) (“We shall determine the cause as on [of an] original appeal. 
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This approach also allows the court to give more attention to its 
supervisory role, through which it studies and adopts consistent rules 
for our trial and appellate courts, has developed a judicial education 
system that is the envy of most of our sister courts, ensures that the 
quality of justice does not vary from area to area in our state, and 
assures that rulings of its intermediate appellate courts are not 
inconsistent with each other or with decisions of the supreme court. It 
may also assure that issues of first impression or requiring 
clarification are transferred to the supreme court for decision. 
How does the Missouri Supreme Court accomplish these goals if 
it actually takes transfer of only a relatively small number of cases 
each year?12 Its judges, I estimate, spend one-third to one-half of their 
time deciding which cases to take as they consider requests by the 
parties for further review of court of appeals decisions to determine 
whether they are correct and are not inconsistent with each other or 
with prior supreme court cases. Each such request (as well as each 
petition for writ filed in the Missouri Supreme Court) is assigned to a 
particular supreme court judge’s office for preparation of a 
memorandum addressing whether a conflict exists, whether an issue 
of first impression is presented, and whether a trial court has acted 
beyond its authority. The supreme court as a whole decides some 600 
or 700 writ or transfer motions each year, with each judge’s office 
preparing a memorandum on one-seventh of this number to be 
shared with the other judges’ offices. The court grants review of 
perhaps 15 percent of these cases, and discusses, but ultimately denies 
review to, another 10 to 20 percent of them. 
It would be a simple matter to double the number of these 
transfer cases that the court takes and, with little additional work, to 
use the transfer memorandum as the basis for an opinion of the 
supreme court rather than leaving the court of appeals’ opinion in 
place. This technique would increase our ranking in the authors’ 
system. But I suggest that this approach would not usually be a good 
or even efficient use of limited state resources. I know that, as a court 
of appeals judge, I took great care in my work and undertook 
 
Section 10, Article V, Constitution of Missouri 1945, V.A.M.S. By reason of the order 
transferring the cause to this Court, the opinion and decision of the St. Louis Court of Appeals 
was necessarily vacated and set aside and may referred to as functus officio.”). 
 12. The court initially transfers more cases than result in opinions because, if the briefing in 
a case reveals that the issues involved have not been preserved or do not in fact require a 
decision on the issues raised in the transfer application, the court may, under its rules, retransfer 
the case to the appellate court. MO. SUP. CT. R. 83.09. 
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difficult, scholarly analyses. I knew that if I did, my opinion would 
remain the final, published opinion on the matter; the work would 
have been wasted—and the time it took wasteful—if I knew there 
were a good chance that the supreme court would substitute its 
opinion for mine on the cases involving the most difficult issues. 
Instead, I was able to take pride that, in over six years of work, less 
than half a dozen cases were ever transferred to the supreme court, 
and most of those adopted my reasoning. This is not the only way a 
supreme court can review the work of its intermediate courts. But I 
suggest it is a good one that works for Missouri much as it does for 
the United States Supreme Court. The “publish or perish” syndrome 
is decried in academia, so why import it to judicial evaluation, 
especially when applied in bulk? 
Nonetheless, if the type of numbers game advocated for by the 
authors comes into vogue, so that quantity rather than quality forms 
the basis of judge evaluation, Missouri and other state supreme courts 
like it will be forced to change how they work to play to the numbers. 
They will decide whether to hand down more cases not because more 
guidance is needed, but because by doing so they will do better in 
empirical ratings. This trend would be much like the often-criticized 
practice of undergraduate and law schools in skewing their 
admissions criteria and how they measure their resources and 
outcomes to emphasize those factors included in U.S. News & World 
Report ratings, instead of those they think help them select the best 
students.13 
II.  NUMBER OF CITATIONS BY OTHER COURTS AS A  
MEASURE OF JUDICIAL QUALITY 
The second criterion the authors use to measure judicial quality 
is the number of citations to the court’s opinions by other state or 
federal courts.14 The larger the number, they suggest, the more 
influential the state’s courts must be, and therefore, the better they 
must be. Otherwise why be influenced by them?15 
 
 13. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions: 
The Pernicious Effects of Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 309, 312 (2006) (“Given the near-perfect 
correlation between the median LSAT score and the school’s ranking, a school may raise its 
median LSAT score and presumably ranking by rejecting students with lower LSAT scores.”). 
 14. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1321 (“We measure opinion quality by using a proxy: the 
number of times that out-of-state courts cited the opinion.”). 
 15. Id. at 1322 (“[O]ut-of-state citations are also a (more) direct measure of out-of-state 
influence.”). 
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What does the number of citations measure?16 Of course, in part, 
it measures quantity, as did the first measure—the more opinions a 
judge writes, the more there are to be cited. As the authors also note, 
however, it is unlikely that other jurisdictions will cite just any 
opinion by a state supreme court.17 Rather, they are likely to cite 
opinions resolving issues that were either unresolved or differently 
resolved by their own court. This leads the authors to conclude that it 
must be better scholarship that leads to some courts being cited more 
than others.18 The authors find it curious, therefore, that other groups 
that rate courts tend to come to different conclusions regarding what 
constitutes good reasoning or scholarship.19 
I do think that an extraordinary number of citations to a 
particular state’s cases—nearly all studies show that California’s 
decisions are cited more than those of any other state, for example20—
does indicate that other states look to that particular state’s reasoning 
on issues. It is not because other courts believe that California’s fine 
state judges reason better or make better decisions, however. Rather, 
the number of out-of-state citations largely measures a characteristic 
other than the intrinsic worth of the opinions; it measures which state 
courts take the lead in addressing new and developing areas of the 
law. 
California quite often fits that mold. This is in part because of its 
size: Issues tend to arise there more often than they would in a 
smaller state in which a smaller number of cases are filed. And it is 
partly because, at least in the estimation of many judges of other 
states, California is looked at as being “friendly” to new and novel 
theories. So, if a Missouri judge wondered what new types of cases 
are likely to be filed in the next half a dozen years, or to estimate 
what new theories may be adopted in the tort field—in other words, 
what will be the new lead paint or class action or novel product 
 
 16. So far as I can determine from the article, I believe only two members of the 2009 
Missouri Supreme Court were members at the time that the study of citations was made, so I 
believe I can be relatively neutral in my analysis of this measure. 
 17. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1322 (“We assume that a high-quality opinion is more likely 
to be useful for out-of-state courts and therefore is more likely to be cited.”). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 1340–41 & tbl.5 (contrasting the citation counts of the Choi, Gulati, and Posner 
study with other contemporary studies). 
 20. E.g., id. at 1340 tbl.5; see also Jake Dear & Edward W. Jessen, “Followed Rates” and 
Leading State Cases, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 683, 710 (2007) (“Our preliminary results show that 
over the course of several decades, the California Supreme Court has been the most followed 
state high court, and that trend continues.”). 
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liability theories that other courts around the country will find 
themselves faced with in the next four or five years—California is the 
first jurisdiction where they would look. It is indeed a bellwether state 
in that regard. 
This is an important role, and California’s decisions can properly 
be seen as leaders in certain fields as a result. But whether this 
characteristic makes it a great court, a terrible court, or just a pilot 
court for new ideas, depends on who is doing the judging. In many 
areas of the country, including Missouri, stability rather than change 
or adoption of new theories of recovery is usually more positively 
valued; the latter may be considered a matter more properly reserved 
to the other, elected branches of government by such groups as the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce.21 The point is not that either perspective 
is the correct one. Rather the point is that which perspective one 
takes is a subjective judgment based on views of the proper role of 
the judicial branch of government; neither is an intrinsic part of being 
a good—or bad—judge. 
That does not mean Missouri and other more cautious states do 
not write leading opinions that have long-lasting jurisprudential 
value. The original 1990 right-to-die case, Cruzan v. Director, 
Missouri Department of Health,22 came out of Missouri, as did 
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v Danforth.23 In 2003, I 
authored the state supreme court opinion in the juvenile death 
penalty case in which the United States Supreme Court held it 
violated the United States Constitution to execute someone who was 
under age eighteen when they committed a murder.24 
But the Missouri Supreme Court did not decide these cases so it 
could get cited; the Missouri Supreme court decides cases as it 
believes the law requires, neither looking for nor shying away from 
the limelight of citation by others. 
As a final comment on this issue, I would at least raise a question 
as to whether it is “better” to decide a case based on federal law or on 
 
 21. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1355 (“[T]he Chamber of Commerce is hardly a neutral 
organization; it is a lobbying group that even becomes involved in individual elections, spending 
large sums attacking and supporting different candidates.” (citing Nina Totenberg, Report: 
Spending on Judicial Elections Soaring, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, May 18, 2008, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10253213)). 
 22. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 23. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 24. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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some other basis that necessarily has a direct relevance to how 
another state may decide a similar issue. In particular, I want to 
mention that state courts like Missouri often prefer to decide cases 
based on their own state law rather than federal law. This preference 
may be related to an increasing belief by many states that their own 
constitutions have for too long been considered as poor cousins of the 
U.S. Constitution. In fact, additional rules or protections set out in 
those state constitutions are seen as reflecting state values that should 
be independently reviewed and, when appropriate, made the basis of 
decision in state supreme court decisions. 
Two Missouri Supreme Court cases provide a great example of 
this distinction. Missouri’s decision in the juvenile death penalty case, 
State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper,25 relied on federal constitutional law 
and was cited and used as the basis for mock arguments throughout 
the United States for the next year or so, until the United States 
Supreme Court issued its decision in the case in 2005. By contrast, in 
2006, the Missouri Supreme Court struck down Missouri’s voter 
photo ID law in Weinschenk v. State26 on the basis that the law 
violated Missouri’s state constitution, which provides special 
protections to the right to vote once a person is validly registered.27 
Because Weinschenk is based on Missouri’s state constitution, it has 
had less influence, as measured by citations by other states, than did 
similar decisions by courts in Georgia and Indiana.28 But, on the other 
hand, it still stands as the law of Missouri, unlike the cases decided 
under federal law, which were effectively overruled by the United 
States Supreme Court.29 I would argue that Missouri’s opinion will 
have the more lasting influence, as it still governs who may vote in 
Missouri. 
 
 25. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 26. Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 27. Id. at 204 (citing MO. CONST. art. I, § 25, art. VIII, § 2). 
 28. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); Common 
Cause/Georgia v. Billups, No. 07-14664, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 593 (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2009). 
 29. Missouri’s case also had a much more fully developed record in which both local and 
state election officials, official records, and a number of individual disenfranchised voters 
testified as to interference of the law with their ability to vote due to their inability to 
reasonably obtain the very limited types of photo IDs permitted. Compare Weinschenk, 203 
S.W.3d at 209 (describing affidavits averring that specific plaintiffs had their right to vote 
burdened by the Missouri Voter ID law), with Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622–23 (describing the 
“limited evidence” in the federal challenge to the Indiana voter ID law that anyone in Indiana 
had actually had their right to vote unduly burdened). 
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III.  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AS MEASURED  
BY DISSENTING OPINIONS 
Finally, the authors suggest that a measure of a state supreme 
court’s political independence can be obtained by tallying up the 
number of times a judge of a particular party dissents from an opinion 
written by a judge of that same party.30 Respectfully, this approach 
does not give sufficient deference to the other, far more real 
differences that are much more often the basis for these dissents. 
Neither does it measure what may be a truer indicator of lack of 
partisanship, and certainly is a truer indicator of a better court: the 
number of times that judges of different parties or appointed by 
governors of different parties vote together. 
Judges in Missouri are appointed under a nonpartisan court 
plan—the Missouri Plan, as it has come to be known throughout 
much of the country.31 The three finalists for a vacancy are nominated 
based on merit by a merit selection commission.32 The governor then 
selects one of the three, and that person then must stand for a 
retention election before he or she begins a term as an appellate or 
supreme court judge.33 A similar process is used in Missouri’s largest 
urban areas;34 in the smaller communities, where judges can run for 
office without seeking large campaign contributions and where their 
reputations are a matter of personal knowledge for the voters, judges 
are still elected.35 Once these judges are on a court, though, few 
lawyers would be able to determine their prior political affiliation, 
and those chosen under merit selection are affirmatively nonpartisan. 
Of course, the executive and legislative branches of state and 
federal government are often dominated by party affiliation, and a 
vote that is not in line with the party’s position is looked at with 
disfavor. Judges are not in a political branch of government, however, 
or at least they are not supposed to be. A bill may have been adopted 
 
 30. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 1323–24 (“Our measure gives a judge a high score if he is 
more likely to vote with opposite-party judges and a low score if he is more likely to vote with 
same-party judges.”). 
 31. Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 637 
(2009). 
 32. MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a). 
 33. Id. § 25(c)(1). 
 34. Id. § 25(a) (making the nonpartisan plan applicable to the “city of St. Louis and 
Jackson County”). 
 35. Id. § 25(b) (allowing “any judicial circuit outside of the city of St. Louis and Jackson 
county . . . to discontinue [the Section 25(a)] plan”). 
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by a Republican majority, or by a Democratic majority, but once it 
becomes law, there is only one way of reading it: as it was written. If a 
judge thinks there is a Republican way of interpreting a statute that is 
different from a Democratic way of doing so, then that individual 
should not be a judge. Reporters, public officials, and political pundits 
nevertheless try to overlay a political gloss on decisions that simply 
does not exist in the eyes of the judges themselves. 
I suspect that, if it were possible to do a true empirical study, one 
would find that differences in voting most often reflect different 
approaches to the law not based on political party but on other life 
experiences that affect the judge’s general approach to issues. These 
life experiences may include living in a small town as opposed to a big 
city or a rural area, or experience in a small, general-practice firm 
versus a big firm or insurance defense firm, or because of religious or 
other cultural differences.36 But more importantly, even were political 
party a determinant—and I have never heard it expressed as such—it 
would be impossible to tease out and separate from all of these other 
factors. 
A better barometer of independence from all of these influences, 
social or political, would be to look at how often the judges of a court 
agree. In a time when all or most members of a court came from the 
same social strata and party, this would not have been as effective a 
measure, for there simply would not have been differences in 
background worth noting. But, in the twenty-first century, most 
courts are made up of persons from very different party, practice, and 
social backgrounds. If they are nonetheless able to overcome these 
differences, and agree the vast majority of times, and if, even when 
there are dissenting opinions, persons of different parties are on the 
same side, then it is a true indicator of a willingness to set aside one’s 
personal views and rule based on the law as adopted by the legislature 
or the people. 
Equally importantly, most judges would say that the ability to 
draw together judges of different backgrounds and help them reach 
consensus is the mark of a good court, for lawyers, trial judges, and 
the public want the law to be clear and consistent. They want to know 
it will not vary depending on what party is in power or which part of 
 
 36. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial 
Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 903 app. at 961–65 (2003) (outlining twenty-two studies analyzing the effects of various 
prior career experiences on judicial decisionmaking). 
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the state the newest judge calls home. They want to know that the law 
is the same for all people. And that is what consensus, not dissenting 
opinions, measures. A statute is a statute is a statute, and if courts are 
doing their jobs correctly, all or almost all judges of a court will 
interpret it in the same way unless it is ambiguous, even if it is viewed 
as controversial or is supported by those in one party but not in 
another. 
IV.  AN ALTERNATIVE, NONQUANTIFIABLE MODEL OF THE  
ROLE OF STATE SUPREME COURTS 
If one cannot measure the worth of a state supreme court by 
tallying cases or citations or dissents, then can one do so at all? That 
is a question only time will answer, but I can suggest that an 
important part of that answer would require a more complete 
understanding and consideration of the role of a state supreme court 
in our justice system. 
One does not judge a state legislature by the number of bills 
passed or how often those bills are copied by other legislatures, just as 
one does not judge a governor by how many executive orders are 
signed or how many regulations executive agencies issue. And it is 
particularly unwise to judge the performance of these branches of 
government in a vacuum without knowing what economic, social, 
cultural, or natural problems that state strives to overcome. So too, 
measuring a court’s worth by tallying the number rather than the 
quality of limited aspects of its work says little about how well it 
fulfills its role as the head of the justice system for the state. 
In this regard, allow me to quote a comment made by Duke Law 
School’s own Dean David Levi in an address to the Albuquerque Bar 
Association discussing the differences between his former role as 
Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of California and his current role as a law school dean. Dean 
Levi noted that, in his role as judge, only limited leadership 
opportunities existed, even though he was chief judge of the busiest 
federal district court, because he was occupied managing cases and 
dockets.37 By contrast, in his role as dean he has learned that law 
schools thrive on leadership: 
 
 37. David F. Levi, Dean, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, From Judge to Dean: Reflections on the 
Bench and the Academy, Address to the Albuquerque Bar Association (May 1, 2008) 
(transcript at 4, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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As dean I am expected to think about the future of the legal 
profession and legal education, and I am expected to lead the 
Duke Law School community so that we anticipate the needs 
of the changing, dynamic world of law practice and law 
scholarship. This is a very great responsibility . . . .38 
As a state supreme court judge, I have a similar responsibility to 
lead and to anticipate and provide guidance through changes and 
problems in the dynamic world of the law. A state supreme court’s 
role is not to resolve individual cases in the first instance, as do trial 
courts; nor is it to correct errors in these individual judgments, as do 
state or federal courts of appeals. Rather, it is to head a third, coequal 
branch of government. This does, in part, involve reviewing and 
deciding cases, to be sure. But, like the U.S. Supreme Court, a state 
supreme court should do so to the extent necessary to clarify the law 
of the state, to resolve conflicts in the law as applied in the 
intermediate appellate courts, and to determine policy issues not 
resolved by prior cases or which are issues of first impression. In fact, 
the more cases a state supreme court finds it must take to clarify the 
law, arguably the less well it has done its job of making the law clear 
in the first instance in prior opinions, rules, and directives.39 
In most states there are many other aspects of the state supreme 
court’s role, however. What they include necessarily varies depending 
on whether the particular supreme court supervises the lower courts, 
oversees the lawyer and judge discipline systems in the states, devises 
 
 38. Id. (transcript at 5). 
 39. I would note that federal and state opinions cannot be reasonably compared in regard 
to number of citations, because federal trial court decisions are so often published, whereas 
state trial court decisions normally are not. E.g., John T. Hundley, Inadvertent “Waiver” of 
Evidentiary Privileges: Can Reformulating the Issue Lead to More Sensible Decisions?, 19 S. ILL. 
U. L. REV. 263, 263 n.3 (1995) (“State court decisions also are more rare than federal, in part 
because trial judges most often decide the issue and state trial court opinions rarely are 
published.”). That means that a federal court decision that clarifies the law will very often be 
cited as the basis of a federal trial court’s decision, and so the number of citations of federal 
appellate or other trial court decisions is accordingly quite large. By contrast, hundreds of state 
trial courts may rely on the clarifying state appellate court decisions each year, but that reliance 
will not be evident in any published cases unless questions about it arose that caused an issue 
regarding it to be addressed on appeal. A good example is an opinion I wrote for the Missouri 
Supreme Court that adopted what is basically the state version of Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), but with a major variation required by Missouri 
statute. See State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146 (Mo. 
2003) (en banc). This decision was the basis of many dozens of educational seminars over the 
next few years and is the guideline used throughout Missouri for the admission of expert 
testimony, but because it settled the law in most regards, there is little reason to cite to it unless 
as part of a rote litany of the standards for admission of evidence. 
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rules governing court procedure, oversees the bar, appoints and often 
heads or serves as a liaison to numerous committees and commissions 
that address issues such as professionalism, children’s justice or 
alternative dispute resolution; plays a role in judicial selection, and 
performs budget and other oversight functions of a branch of 
government, as is the case in Missouri. In some states, separate 
entities such as judicial counsels are assigned some of these roles. 
And, of course, essential to its success in these tasks is ensuring 
that trial courts perform efficiently and effectively, justice is 
evenhanded and fair throughout the state, court doors remain open to 
those entitled to protection or recompense under the law, that bias 
and discrimination do not play any role in determining cases, and that 
respect for individual rights and liberties exists. 
One also cannot ignore that a court does not perform its various 
roles in a vacuum. The court must communicate with lawyers and 
other players in the justice system to see what is working and what 
needs to be improved, coordinate its work with executive branch 
departments such as corrections or social services or child welfare 
agencies, and work with the legislature and executive branch on 
budgets and other economic issues. 
If, as in Missouri and many other states, a supreme court 
oversees a unified court system, it creates an administrative arm to 
oversee the day-to-day workings of the courts and to provide support 
for their work in the form of computer support, logistical support, 
support services such as translators and interpreters, clerk and judge 
education, and training—and, yes even to measure the workload of 
the various trial courts and court clerks. A supreme court does not 
undertake these efforts in order to measure the quality of justice 
delivered, however. That is what appeals are for. That is the purpose 
of judicial performance evaluations and voters decisions in contested 
or retention elections. That is where quality is determined. 
Because of the often confidential or even esoteric nature of the 
work of the courts, the judiciary is also often referred to as “the least 
understood branch.”40 Yet, confidence in the fairness of the courts is 
indispensable to the effectiveness of our justice system and the 
workings of our democracy. Therefore, most judges believe that 
reaching out to the public through educational programs and through 
 
 40. E.g., William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—
Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1167, 1190 n.122 (1978). 
STITH IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:26:00 PM 
2009] MEASURING JUDGES 1757 
programs designed to help the public better understand the workings 
of the court system also are critical to the judicial branch’s fulfillment 
of its societal role. Leadership of these efforts, too, properly often 
falls on the state supreme court. 
There is no single or all-encompassing manner of judging how 
well a court fulfills these goals, for each state is in a unique situation 
and must deal with its individual history and issues. A particular 
opinion, program, or rule may be judged as good or bad, but a court 
cannot be judged by attempting to quantify its work product any 
more than a particular governor or legislator can be judged as good or 
bad based on how many bills he or she signs or vetoes, or how well a 
particular state program works, without looking at both the whole of 
its work and the issues and problems it faces. 
This is not to say that I oppose any attempt to assess how well a 
court is accomplishing particular goals; I simply do not believe that 
the three noted criteria provide a valid measure. For instance, in 2006, 
Missouri became the first state in the nation to accept the American 
Bar Association’s offer to evaluate its court system.41 That 2006 study 
surveyed a broad group of knowledgeable persons throughout 
Missouri concerning, as the paper itself describes, matters “pertinent 
to a properly functioning court system: (1) Qualifications, 
Experience, and Diversity; (2) Judicial Powers; (3) Financial 
Resources; (4) Structural Safeguards; (5) Accountability and 
Transparency; (6) Needs and Expectations of the Community; and 
(7) Efficiency.”42 Missouri was rated very positively on almost all 
indicators except those involving funding decisions over which it has 
little control.43 Following completion of the Missouri study a few 
other states are undergoing a similar assessment. 
 
 41. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, STATE COURT 
ASSESSMENT PROJECT, THE MISSOURI COURT SYSTEM: AN ASSESSMENT i (2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/judind/scap/missouri.pdf. 
 42. Id. 
 43. For instance, the study rates Missouri positively regarding the qualifications of its 
judges, their mode of selection, the training provided judges upon taking office, and continuing 
judicial education. Id. at 3. Missouri measures positively concerning allocation of jurisdiction 
among the courts, administrative unification, and judicial control over rulemaking, as well as 
structural safeguards such as length of judicial terms, immunity for actions taken by judges in 
official capacity, and unbiased assignment of judges; accountability and transparency through 
open proceedings; absence of improper influence, code of conduct, judicial evaluations and 
discipline structure; and case flow management. Id. at 3–5. It receives mixed ratings on 
technology, because although it has a top rated case management and information sharing 
system, budgetary restraints have not yet allowed it to adopt e-filing. Id. at 64–65. It also needs 
more frontline clerks to move cases faster, and more staff in the office of the state court 
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There no doubt are other methods of looking at a court system 
also, and none of them is perfect. I would suggest that no system can 
be successful that does not take into account the subjective nature of 
judging; empirical measures, by their nature, are unable to do so. 
 
administrator, again a function of budget. Id. at 61–62. Missouri needs to also work on 
increasing the confidence of communities of color and the percentage of women and minorities 
on the courts as compared to the population as a whole, as well as on increasing funds for legal 
services and public defenders, id. at 15–17, 51–52, but it receives very positive evaluations for its 
handling of pro se litigants, problem-solving courts, translation services, and absence of 
improper input on judicial decisionmaking, id. at 4–5. 
